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HURMAN ARNOLD'S The Bottlenecks of Business' may be the
important political tract of its time. Broadly interpreted, it is an
earnest plea for restoration of free markets in the United Statesfor preserving our democratic way of life and preserving free internal trade
as the basis of our political liberty. Proximately, it is a plea for larger appropriations to finance enforcement of the Sherman Act and, tacitly, for
sparing the act, the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of justice,
and Mr. Arnold from the assault of collectivists whom the New Deal and
the Defense Commission have drawn to Washington from the Left and
from the Right. Arnold and his program are threatened with political
liquidation; but he seems quite indisposed to accept that fate or to facilitate concealment of issues which his resignation would involve. His recent
prosecutions have been planned, publicized, and carried through with consummate political tact. The book is an appeal, vigorously and adroitly
presented, for continuance of the program. His liquidation now may not
proceed on schedule; and it can hardly be accomplished at all without a
clear revelation of issues and policy implications which his superiors
would like to avoid. In any case, it may appear later on that Arnold, almost single-handedly, forestalled administrative legitimatizing of arrangements which have been only less open since the Schechter decision.2 Extralegal approval of "industrial self-government" still has much to commend
it to politicians, with its simultaneous appeasement of both business and
labor leaders; and the military emergency provides an excuse which is as
plausible as it is bad.
The large responsibilities and opportunities of his present position have
transformed Arnold into a serious and responsible person. Readers of his
earlier books, 3 if they have not followed his recent activities, may well be
amazed at the transformation. A rather cynical, sophistical commentator
on our political folklore and symbolism now appears as the zealous, skill* Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Law School.
xThe Bottlenecks of Business. By Thurman Arnold. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock,
1940. Pp. ix, 335. $2.50.
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ful advocate of a great cause. Arnold long displayed possibilities as a satirist. But his efforts in that direction were, to some of us, always disappointing and often a bit suspect intellectually. One could seldom discover the truth which guided his sallies at vulgar error and myth; or, if one
pieced it together inferentially in separate contexts, it was often as ridiculous as the objects of his ridicule. His was anormative criticism of normative persuasions. Yet, if he never bothered to examine or to reveal his own
normative premises, he somehow evaded classification as the mere cynic
or smart-aleck whom serious folk might properly ignore-reflecting perhaps only the moral boredom and confusion which was (and is?) public
opinion in this apathetic, disillusioned democratic world. Arnold is now
neither bored nor confused. Moreover, he has the distinction of being the
only highly and strategically placed advocate of the kind of economy
within which we might be able to preserve domestically what we propose
so zealously to defend against the Axis powers.
There are other recent examples of people adapting their economic and
political philosophies to the special tasks which have come their way.
Conspicuous among them is Henry Wallace who, in Washington, has
naturally been unable to live comfortably with the free-market liberalism
which was once his. So, Mr. Wallace has contrived and exhibited publicly
another politico-economic creed which generalizes and thus justifies his
agricultural program as permanent national policy. Any literate person
may now identify Mr. Wallace as our leading advocate of the totalitarian
or pre-totalitatian economy of negotiation among tightly organized,
monopolizing functional groups-as the mystical, sentimental, emotional
partisan of democracy who zealously upholds it internationally while
championing the kind of internal policies which have undermined and destroyed it abroad. If Mr. Wallace has made a virtue of trade restraint,
others prominent in the government have provided plausible rationale for
the financial policies which are the proper complementary preparation for
civil war. These colleagues have sophistically extended the sound case for
temporary, emergency reflation and conjured up an argument for increasing the federal debt indefinitely-although Mr. Wallace himself has given
this argument perhaps its most elegant and ingenuous statement. Other
leaders, feeling called upon to justify promiscuous dispensation of subsidies and monopoly privileges, have favored the reading and listening
public with engaging purchasing-power doctrines which reproduce almost
literally the pompous nonsense with which Republican orators used to sell
industrial tariffs to agricultural voters.
It is proper that responsible officials should thus reveal to the public
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their persuasions and the intellectual stuff of which they are made. The
practice facilitates judgment of how dangerous they are in places of power
and, in rare instances, brings to light an individual who can safely be
trusted with the power he has and more. Out of the great literary flood
which is the public-relations activity of our governmental agencies and
leaders, comes now at long last a vigorous, skillful, persuasive statement
of a policy position consistent with preservation of our political freedom
and democratic institutions. Thurman Arnold has discovered, in the freemarket idea, something worth believing, something worth fighting for.
The idea, of course, is not novel; and it is surprising that, of all the academic people whom this administration has raised to prominence, this
lawyer should be the only one to rediscover and invoke it as a guide for
policy. If an old idea is the substance of the book, the book, however, is
still a very novel document. Economists will not find here a superlative
definition of the idea or of its manifold implications; indeed, they may
hardly recognize the thing in the dress Arnold has given it; but they will
discover what the thing looks like when it is properly and modestly dressed
for presentation to essentially hostile electorates and legislatures at a particular point in time.
The inner substance of Arnold's earlier books (if I mistake not) was discursive dissertation on how to be, if not a dictator, a successful politician
-on how to get things done politically. Some of us failed to learn much
from these books, but not Arnold. His ideas about strategy and tactics,
if less than inspiring in the general, theoretical form of his sociological
writing, are impressive and fascinating as he exhibits them in a practical,
concrete application. Having acquired a fundamental persuasion of his
own, Arnold has contrived one of the most skillful and persuasive arguments for free-market liberalism, as an immediate, practical program, that
can be found anywhere. If one looks at the book as a whole, there is
enough truth and wisdom to satisfy rather exacting academic readers; if
one looks at details, there is enough good hokum and engaging half-truth
to meet the best current professional standards of good public relations;
and, if one seeks to find where the argument is dangerously exposed to
counter-attack, the place is not easy to locate.
Superficially, this book is the most weazeling statement of the general
position that could well be put together. If one adds up all the concessions
Arnold makes to different groups, without regard for the innocently general statements and the pervasive overtone of the discussion, one might
conclude that there is nothing left for Arnold to be against but the Sherman Act. Carrying the ball for free trade, he runs toward and behind his
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own goal line whenever he imagines an opponent in the offing; but he never
gets downed behind his goal and somehow keeps on the offensive throughout. In the end he is headed squarely in the right direction and, unlike his
opponents, exhausted merely from watching his frightened rushes, is fresh
and fit at the end as at the start.
Arnold, in other words, is unlike us quixotic orthodox economists who
delight in attacking impregnable positions. This is a political situation
dominated by minorities, and especially by minorities with vast stakes in
existing restraints upon internal trade. A few of us may rail against them
in our quiet, academic isolation; but Arnold is fighting a real political battle and against great odds. He cannot take on all the powerful minorities
at once or even annoy one of them without risking his political hide. He
can attack only gangsters (defining that category most narrowly) and
relatively harmless, weakling monopolists whose unpopularity is notorious
and whose monopolizing practices have miraculously escaped the general
sanctioning implicit in current policy and opinion. The important thing
is to prosecute somebody in the name of the Sherman Act, if only the devil
himself. The attack upon restraint of trade must be gotten under way
somehow and kept going against something; and Arnold, naturally, is
more interested in keeping himself and the idea alive than in charting the
ultimate limits of conquest.
It is not disparaging to say that Arnold's interest in existing restraints
of trade varies inversely with their importance. He has a fine nose for
sacred cows and a healthy respect for them. Such animals abound in the
areas he traverses; but he never runs headlong into one and never passes
near one without pausing to stroke it affectionately and to feed it something nice. He may let drop some very nasty crack about it while he is
soothing some other cow far away; but his deportment in the immediate
neighborhood is unfailingly respectful and deferential. The amazing thing
is that, with all his deferring, retreating, disclaiming, and apologizing, the
author still manages to get somewhere, to advocate something substantial, and to keep his colors waving no matter how often he hauls them
down.
What Arnold is doing may be indicated by contrast. If I were writing
a tract on his general subject, I should start (and end) by saying that our
serious and ominous monopoly problem lies in the labor market and in the
power of unions to behave monopolistically. Next, I should maintain that
enterprise monopoly is largely and basically a problem of excessive corporate size, of corporate imperialism run mad, of the fantastic, monstrous
aggregations of businesses which, like our cancerous metropolises, we mis-
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takenly regard as monuments to our economic efficiency. Next, that we
would not need to worry much about collusive pricing by manufacturers if
ownership units were large enough only to obtain the economies of largescale but highly specialized production; but that it is a hopeless task to
prevent effective collusion in industries dominated by giant enterprise aggregations with vast concentration of financial power. Next, that a major
barrier to really competitive enterprise and efficient service to consumers
is to be found in advertising-in national advertising especially, and in
sales organizations which cover great national or regional areas. Saying
these things (and they all boil down to a size problem, in both labor and
industrial organization), I should be telling the truth-and also rendering
both myself and the truth a considerable disservice thereby.
Arnold, on the other hand, is prepared to tell, and perhaps to see, only
as much of the truth as may safely or helpfully be told right now. He
bows deeply before the "right to bargain collectively" and denies any intention of prosecuting unions as monopolizers of their own labor services.
He promises, in this area, to observe the limits set by minority as well as
majority opinions of the Supreme Court. The Sherman Act, in his view, is
not concerned with union activities directed at wages, hours, working
conditions, or union recognition, but only with racketeering and with
flagrant collusion between unions and employers to fix product prices-i.e.,
with the abuse of unions to police restraint of product trade. While such
a program ignores the heart of the problem, it is still full of dynamite and,
if pursued, would gravely disturb many organizations and leaders whose
public-relations have placed them at the opposite end of the scale from
gangsters and racketeers. With all his concessions and disclaimers, Arnold
still has his teeth in something here. Indeed, he has probably bitten off
more than he can chew; but he has taken a position in which even labor
is rather estopped from direct attack.
Arnold likewise pays deep respect to the economies of mass production
and deplores popular notions of the Sherman Act as an attack upon bigness. He never raises the innocent question of whether production economies ever or frequently require really monopolistic size, or have any place
in explaining the actual corporate aggregations which are so large a part
of our actual monopoly problem. Nor does he suggest distinction between
those productional economies of great size which, if real, are socially desirable and the advertising and selling "economies" which, while possibly
very real to the enterprise, are disastrous diseconomies and wastes for the
community. Mr. Arnold has no designs upon bigness, save as it gets into
the wrong hands and becomes patently wicked. Given the political situa-
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tion and the prevailing popular myths, this again is as it should be-as is
Arnold's discreet silence on the relation between advertising and monopoly.
A similar explanation may be offered for Arnold's snide and disparaging
remarks about system builders, about elaborate coherent schemes of reform, and about broad, general doctrines as to governmental policy. As
against communists, socialists, and collectivist planners generally, his disparagement is appropriate and consistent. But what about proponents of
schemes consistent with Arnold's own proximate program and purposes?
What about advocates of the kind of world or institutional structure which
is the proper distant goal of his own schemes, and which alone gives real
meaning and significance to his immediate measures? If, in this connection, Arnold is merely kidding the public, being the deliberate and rather
transparent hypocrite, again well and good. It would be folly for Arnold
to identify himself with any broad "ism," or to expose more than the surface implications of his own proposals.
It may be profoundly wise for an assistant attorney-general to exhibit
himself as a plain, simple, ingenuous soul, suspicious of theories and systems, and intent merely on following his nose and enforcing the law as he
finds it. Discerning readers will find, however, if Arnold does not, that his
book is full of general ideas and theory and, indeed, that these ideas account for its being a good book instead of a bad or inconsequential one.
The free-market conception, among ideas which have content and relevance to our problems, is highly general and abstract; and, as a norm for
policy, it has innumerable implications which Arnold is not reluctant to expound vaguely or, if the enemy is not too strong, in terms of definite particulars. Moreover, Arnold had many pointed things to say about the relation of trade restraint to fiscal policy and the monetary outlook. If these
wise observations are not informed by dearly conceived norms of monetary and budgetary policy, they are simply a fraud.
I trust these remarks will not make Arnold afraid of his shadow or induce schizoid tendencies; but I must say that the difference between system-builders and persons who argue for particular measures in terms of
norms of policy as to trade and money is tenuous indeed. One formulates
a broad institutional pattern according to his lights and tastes and then
appraises particular schemes in terms of whether they lead toward or
away from his ideal; the other seemingly gets interested in particular
measures and, to support them, constructs the general scheme of things to
which they are a proximate means. No responsible advocate of traditional
economic liberalism, of free markets and stable money, hopes to see the
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necessary institutional structure built overnight or achieved by revolution. Such a faith commits one absolutely to gradualism and, in the face
of strongly adverse trends, to the proximate opportunism which Arnold
stresses to a fault.
If I belabor here a simple point, it is because it disturbs me greatly as I
try to pass judgment on Arnold and his book. The appeal for an immediate, preliminary program is much stronger by virtue of being not patently
doctrinaire--by virtue of the vagueness and flexibility of the norms on
which the argument rests. However, I cannot avoid suspicion that Arnold
is as much afraid of truth, 4 and of his own moral premises, in the utter
privacy of his own thoughts as in the political arena. If so, he may be unworthy of great trust. For the moment, he is a more effective advocate of
free-market liberalism because he distrusts big words and grand schemes.
We need able people who will do the hard, dull work that can be done in
Washington now. However, one must consider the possibility that Arnold, if supported in his present nose-following, may next year be following his nose into other activities which require a different set of normative
persuasions and a radically different kind of world as a goal to justify
them. Actually, I would trust the fellow; but I wish he would trust himself enough to permit my offering more than intuition as a reason why
others should trust him too.
It is significant that Arnold wants no new legislation-even wants not
to think about it. Here as elsewhere I have no objection to what he says
unless he believes it. It would be unwise to ask help from Congress at this
juncture, save for appropriations. Proposing that teeth be put in the
Sherman Act, he might awake some morning to find that Congress had
repealed it without roll call. While Washington is packed with business
and labor leaders, old-fashioned liberals should mention the act only in
whispers or obscure euphemisms; and, when others mention it, we should
insist, with Arnold, that the act has no teeth save for wicked people and,
in an emergency or out, is as flexible as the Constitution itself.
Arnold's tactics are meticulously correct; but are they informed or guided by any strategy? What I make out of Arnold is that monopoly prosecutions should be a kind of perpetual witchhunt, tormenting and dislodging people who make too much money selling things or spend too much
producing them; our anti-trust laws should be reinterpreted administratively as simple proscription of unreasonable behavior. In other words,
there should be no law at all, but merely endless debate between govern4 It may forestall misunderstanding to explain that I intend here no reference to theological
truth or to "first principles" derived from God, popes, or formal logic.
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ment lawyers and counsel for hapless defendants, each trying to persuade
the jury-sitting public that particular conduct lies outside or inside the
moral pale as defined by emotive slogans currently in vogue.
Lawyers, with their characteristic distaste for government by law, will
doubtless like this phase of Arnold's argument. (Only a crochety economist could sense resemblance between what Arnold is proposing and the
more outlandish make-work rules which he and others have observed in,
say, the building trades.) If he has his way, trade regulation must become
the same wondrous mystery as constitutional law. Indeed, his more dithyrambic remarks about the Sherman Act do not avoid that ponderous ambiguity and impenetrable profundity which distinguish (or raise doubts
about) the legalistic mind. The act, it seems, is very definite legislation;
it is infinitely flexible; it opposes nothing that is good; it does not necessarily apply to anything in particular; it is a bulwark against private usurpation of power; it is our economic common law. But what is it really?
Well-it is what the courts say it is, in cases which attorneys-general bring
before the courts to find out what it is. All this, one gathers, is as it should
be. Courts are a fine thing, as are attorneys-general and lawyers generally.
They can be trusted to work things out. Legislatures and laymen, in such
delicate matters, should defer to lawyers. The professional arguers can
handle such things better if given free rein and left to themselves.
But I do not like the rule of reason (either Mr. Arnold's or the Court's);
I am skeptical about this talk of the Sherman Act as a broad constitutional principle of government; and I am diffident about turning our monopoly problems over to a profession which has demonstrated almost infinite
capacity to misunderstand them. We have never had an anti-monopoly
policy in fact; few lawyers or courts have ever condoned such policy; and
the unsubstantial concessions which have been made to advocates of freer
markets, in legislation, in court decisions, and in sporadic bursts of innocuous prosecutions, have mainly enabled us to postpone effective action until monopoly conditions have become so consolidated, until interested
minorities have become so numerous and powerful, and until the public
has become so enamoured of other, incompatible causes, that effective
action seems now nearly impossible.
Mr. Arnold, in his present post, has been on a kind of honeymoon. The
National Industrial Recovery Act inaugurated an orgy of price-fixing
and invited businessmen to do as patriots what they had been doing before, on a vast scale, to be sure, but furtively and with slightly bad conscience. With the Schechter decision, those groups which were not sufficiently organized, disciplined, respectable, and experienced for "industrial
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self-government" went their way; others were spared the inconvenience
of public hearings but evidently saw no need for restraining trade with
any great care as to methods or with any real secrecy. Business men were
justly proud of their collusive schemes and, I am told, explained them
carefully to all kinds of people, even to old-fashioned economists-not to
mention their careless filing of incriminating documents.
One cannot deny that Arnold has done a magnificent job. The record
is impressive, even when one makes every allowance for the favorable
circumstances which he faced. On the other hand, one must be careful
about extrapolations. Arnold has skimmed off a rich cream of prosecution
opportunities; he has lowered some barriers to recovery; and, above all,
he has saved the free-market idea from the utter demoralization which
must have ensued if open and flagrant restraint of trade had proceeded
without check or punishment. If his program of prosecutions serves only
to drive collusion underground, into some decent secrecy, that alone will
be a precious gain. I think he may be able to do more than that. But I do
not think he can make large or permanent contribution to solution of our
monopoly problems, either with the procedures he has been using or with
any which are available to him under existing legislation. What he offers,
unfortunately, is the best that can safely be tried now or in the near future.
On the other hand, only a defeatist attitude would counsel our ignoring
now the question of what should come next if this succeeds.
Any substantial achievements by way of monopoly reform must start,
I submit, by repudiating that timorous squeamishness which is the rule of
reason. When lawyers try to draw a line between lawful and unlawful restraint of trade, they invariably end up with something that looks like
the silhouette of a roller-coaster. The idea is that of proscribing behavior
involving substantial restraint without otherwise inconveniencing anyone or narrowing his freedom. The purpose may be laudable; but the result is that a few people get caught, rather fortuitously, and the growth of
monopoly, with perhaps some formal modification, proceeds apace.
I do not maintain that rules of reason can be dispensed with or that
broad, general rules of policy are without value (what the courts have left
of anti-trust legislation is now a precious refuge or anchor in a collectivist
storm); rather, that main reliance must be placed on definite, legislative
implementation, on unambiguous rules of law; and that such rules, if they
prevent much restraint, must also and incidentally keep many people
from doing things where substantial restraint is neither intended nor possible. The problem is that of selecting for proscription certain practices and
arrangements, highly useful or essential for restraint of competition, which
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are not essential or highly useful for the conduct of competitive enterprise.
More narrowly, it is a problem of depriving corporations of powers and
privileges which were unwisely granted, have been patently abused, and
are quite unnecessary for effective organization or efficient operation and
management. Our whole corporation law, like our patent law, needs complete overhauling. 5
Mr. Arnold comes disquietingly near to saying that all our industries
should be treated as public utilities, and the Anti-trust Division transformed into a super-public-utility commission with power, not to fix prices
(rates) but to harrass those who charge unreasonably until they abandon
the practice. He will dislike this imputation, of course; but what else is
meant when one proposes efficiency of service to consumers as the test of
exposure to prosecution? Mr. Arnold has no designs on monopolistic business so long as it charges competitive prices! With his staff following actual prices and computing what the corresponding competitive prices
would be (!), Arnold will be crouched ready to pounce upon discrepancies
as they appear and to charge the offenders with I don't know what. It is
my impression that railroads and public utilities, having enjoyed this kind
of attention from considerably more specialized agencies for quite a while,
do not present a picture which would encourage general resort to the control arrangements which are unavoidable in these industries. Price regulation has no real alternative there save the perhaps more dangerous device of governmental ownership. Neither is likely to work very well. If
the public-utility category were much larger-as good collectivists would
like to see it--our politico-economic set-up would have collapsed long ago.
Outside this category, however, we have the happy choice of preserving
effective competition and letting competition fix prices. Presumably this
is what Arnold believes in. If so, he ought to concern himself about maintaining effective competition, not about hammering monopoly prices down
to competitive levels with grand juries.
As regards labor monopoly, I share Arnold's distaste for new legislation and his penchant for preoccupation with the short view. Until telepathy is disproved, even thinking about it is dangerous; and, from here and
now, it is almost impossible to think constructively in any case. We might
face and solve the problem of corporate size; we could repair the damage of
sThis is not the place to spell out details of my own tentative schemes for such reform.
Indeed, I must confess that my thinking along these lines has not advanced much since I
made some rash proposals a few years ago in a "Public Policy Pamphlet," A Positive Program
for Laissez-Faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy (1934). Iam certain thatany
competent specialist, following the same general ideas, could formulate better concrete suggestions; I wish that some of them would make the effort.
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bad patent laws, implementing monopoly arrangements utterly unrelated
to the proper purpose of patents; and we could handle rather easily the
problem of trade associations and collective bargaining among manufacturers. But what, I ask, could Congress or courts really do, if they tried,
to limit the power of national organizations of workers (whether organized
on trade or industrial lines)? How shall particular organizations, once
strong, be compelled or persuaded to accept their share of new and displaced workers-i.e., to accept wage-rate terms that are consistent with
free movement into the industry, occupation, or trade? And how can we
preserve a workable democratic system without some approach to a free
labor market and free occupational migration? I do not know-and I do
not blame Arnold for not raising such questions.
The acuteness of our labor problem is suggested by the imminent danger of Arnold's political liquidation. He has done nothing against unions
and will do nothing, that any reasonable person could question. But labor
resents what he has done and distrusts him, as it distrusts all free-market
ideas. It wants tariffs; it wants complete freedom from the Sherman Act;
and, in fact, it wants employers who can fix their selling prices collusively
too. American trade and industrial unionism makes sense only for "wellordered" industries-makes sense only as part of a tight cartellization of
industries where it is strong. It wants no competition from abroad and
none at home, either in its own markets or in those of its employers. If
employers will not or cannot police their product markets against chiselers,
unions will undertake that task themselves. Wage fixing is price fixing;
labor monopoly means product monopoly even if employers compete effectively; and better wage bargains can be obtained from employers who do
not compete with one another than from those who do.
On all sides one hears that the way to abundance is for everyone to
charge more and sell less-i.e., to organize, to restrict production, and to
raise prices. Monopoly in agriculture is a vaunted achievement of humanitarian reformers. Monopoly in labor markets is a thing which one can
question only on pain of being ostracized as a Tory or Fascist-and an enemy of working men-even though one posits a maximizing of labor income
and a minimizing of inequality as proper goals or tests of policy. Monopoly in product markets, if still condemned because its practitioners are
economic royalists, is increasingly commended or condoned as necessary
to protection of labor monopoly and to that orderliness and rigidity in
particular industries which is the prelude to infinite disorder in our national economy and in our political life.
Into such a world, Thurman Arnold has introduced a skillful and per-
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suasive plea for freer markets. His brilliant effort may serve to keep alive
a precious idea or bit of wisdom which, if it survives an inauspicious era,
may enable us to build that world of freedom and abundance which was
foreshadowed a century ago in England and America. If we do not bow to
German military power, we may sometime shake off an allegiance to German economic ideology which we accepted substantially before the last
war and, with our Allies, accepted almost wholly afterwards. I recognize
how easy it is in wartime to find all kinds of devils in the enemy and to
blame him for our own mistakes. However, as Arnold intimates, the great
ideological conflict of the modem period is (was?) between English freemarket liberalism of the early i 9 th century and a German politico-economic creed which stressed state control of economic life and industrial
development. Germany never accepted English liberalism; and even her
best scholars rarely understood Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham and
the tradition of thought identified with them. On the other hand, the
German creed was always congenial to our own powerful minorities, seeking special favors from the state, and to politicians who lived by such dispensations. Its emphasis upon social legislation appealed to the finest
sentiments and led us, sensitive about our so-called "backwardness," into
imitative measures subtly but deeply incompatible with our democratic
tradition. Appeasing greedy minorities, on the one hand, and sentimental
reformers, on the other, we have ignored and seemingly repudiated, as a
desideratum,that basic dualism of competitive and political controls without which our nation cannot long remain productive or united or free.
Modern authoritarianism comprises strangely diverse sects whose leaders bitterly contest their claims to power; its unwitting apostles are legion;
but, practically and in principle, it has but one opponent, namely, English
free-market liberalism. Rejecting this element in our political and intellectual heritage (as England itself seems likely to do), we may fight for the
privilege of finding our own way back to government by authority; but we
cannot wisely regard ourselves as defenders of any great world cause.
Smith, and Bentham especially, stand out, I think, as the great political
philosophers of modem democracy. Their special insight was that political and economic power must be widely dispersed and decentralized in a
world that would be free; that economic control must, to that end, be
largely divorced from the state and effected through a competitive process
in which participants are relatively small and anonymous; and that the
state must jealously guard its prerogatives of controlling relative prices
(and wages), not for the purpose of exercising them directly itself but to
prevent organized minorities from usurping and using them against the
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common interest. It is such wisdom which Arnold's book and its bold
popularization may keep alive in American opinion.
If I belabor him for being unduly preoccupied with a short view and
unmindful of long-range considerations, I do this mainly for the purpose
of raising questions which, I think, should be discussed, at least in academic circles-questions which Arnold would be unwise to raise if he
wanted to. He has already been courageous to the verge of folly. He has
said more, and spoken more candidly, than would be appropriate if he
were wholly concerned about his own political survival. If the political
finesse of his words and actions make it hard for trade union and trade
association leaders to liquidate him, his transparent zeal and purpose also
make it easy. If he has not escaped defeat, he has assured that it will be
rather glorious if it comes. He would greatly advance a cause by keeping
at his present job; but he might advance the cause still more by losing the
job because of what he boldly stands for. This, among other things, will
doubtless give his opponents pause.

